In this essay, I compiled a high-level overview of all major spectrum auctions conducted by Industry Canada and Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED), including their key outcomes. I also summarized relevant parliamentary acts, ministerial orders, and regulatory decisions shaping Canada’s spectrum policy, and included major spectrum assignments done outside of auctions since the 1980s. I sourced this primarily from the ISED and CRTC websites and organized it clearly for easy reference.

Major Spectrum Auctions in Canada (Industry Canada / ISED)

• 1999 – 24/38 GHz Broadband Wireless Auction: Canada’s first-ever spectrum auction was held in 1999 for fixed Broadband Wireless Access in the 24 GHz and 38 GHz bands. Twelve companies won licenses (including new entrants like Wispra Networks), and the auction raised approximately C$171.8 million (Spectrum: By auction/year – Canadian Telecommunications Association). This auction allocated high-frequency spectrum for point-to-point and broadband wireless services in urban areas.
• 2001 – PCS Auction (2 GHz): In January 2001, Industry Canada auctioned additional Personal Communications Services (PCS) spectrum in the 1.9 GHz band. The auction ran Jan 15 – Feb 1, 2001, and 52 of 62 licenses were won, yielding a total of C$1.482 billion in bids (Auction of Additional PCS Spectrum in the 2 GHz Frequency Range). Major mobile carriers (Bell, TELUS, Rogers) were the principal winners, along with a few smaller players, expanding capacity for digital cellular networks.
• 2004–2005 – 2300 MHz WCS & 3500 MHz FWA Auctions: Industry Canada auctioned spectrum for Wireless Communications Service (WCS at 2.3 GHz) and Fixed Wireless Access (FWA at 3.5 GHz) to enable rural broadband and fixed wireless providers. An initial auction in 2004 and a residual auction in 2005 together awarded 36 licenses, with total winning bids of about C$68.9 million (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada). These auctions licensed spectrum for fixed broadband links and rural internet services.
• 2008 – AWS-1 Mobile Auction (1.7/2.1 GHz): From May to July 2008, the Advanced Wireless Services auction offered 105 MHz of new mobile spectrum in the 1.7/2.1 GHz bands. Notably, 40 MHz was set aside for new entrants to foster competition. Fifteen bidders won licenses across Canada, including new mobile carriers (e.g. WIND Mobile, Videotron, Eastlink) alongside incumbents, and the auction raised C$4.25 billion (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada). This AWS-1 auction introduced new competitors to the Canadian cellular market under conditions that mandated roaming and antenna tower sharing.
• 2009 – Air-Ground Services Auction (849/894 MHz): A small auction in 2009 licensed spectrum for air-to-ground communications (for in-flight telephone/internet services) in the 849–851 MHz and 894–896 MHz bands. Only one national license was available; it was won by SkySurf Canada, for C$2.1 million (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada). This allowed the deployment of commercial in-flight connectivity services.
• 2014 – 700 MHz Mobile Broadband Auction: Following the digital TV transition (which freed UHF channels 52–69), Canada auctioned the 700 MHz “beachfront” spectrum for mobile broadband in January 2014 (Spectrum auction – Wikipedia). Eight companies won licenses, including all major national carriers and regional providers, and the auction raised a record C$5.27 billion (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada). These low-band frequencies (698–806 MHz) are prized for wide coverage and building penetration; the auction results ensured that Bell, Rogers, TELUS, and others obtained 700 MHz spectrum while setting aside spectrum for smaller regional players in some regions. (Public safety agencies were separately allocated two 10 MHz blocks in this band outside the auction.) (HE8679_.C2_F7_2011_c.2_Framework_for_spectrum_auctions_in)
• 2015 – AWS-3 Auction (1.7/2.1 GHz): In March 2015, ISED offered Advanced Wireless Services-3 spectrum (1755–1780 MHz / 2155–2180 MHz) for mobile use. The auction design included set-aside spectrum for new entrants. Five carriers won licenses, with Videotron and WIND (new entrants) acquiring set-aside spectrum at favorable prices, and incumbents Bell and TELUS winning open spectrum. The auction closed with C$2.11 billion in total bids (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada). This further expanded 4G spectrum holdings, particularly bolstering the spectrum of regional competitors.
• 2015 – 2500 MHz BRS Auction: In mid-2015, Canada auctioned the Broadband Radio Service band (2500–2690 MHz), which had historically been used for wireless cable (MCS/MDS) and was being repurposed for 4G/LTE. Nine companies, including incumbents and fixed wireless providers, won licenses, and the auction raised C$755.4 million (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada). Notably, TELUS and Videotron were among the largest winners of 2500 MHz spectrum, while Rogers and Bell already held substantial 2.5 GHz spectrum through prior holdings. This auction completed the transition of the 2.5 GHz band to mobile broadband use.
• 2015 & 2018 – Residual Auctions: After the main 2014–2015 auctions, ISED held smaller “residual” auctions to license unsold or returned spectrum. In late 2015, the remaining licenses in the 700 MHz and AWS-3 bands were auctioned for about C$58.5 million total (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada). In 2018, ISED auctioned leftover licenses in several bands (700 MHz, 2500 MHz, 2300 MHz, and PCS-G) to regional operators, raising C$43.4 million. These residual auctions allowed smaller players like Cogeco, Xplornet, and Freedom Mobile to obtain spectrum that had not been taken in the initial auctions.
• 2019 – 600 MHz Auction: In April 2019, Canada auctioned the 600 MHz band (614–698 MHz), which had been cleared by the post-2011 TV spectrum repacking. Seven companies obtained licenses, with regional provider Freedom Mobile (Shaw) and Rogers Communications spending the most to secure large blocks, alongside other bidders like Telus, TBayTel, SaskTel, Videotron, and Eastlink. The 600 MHz auction raised a total of C$3.438 billion (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada). This low-frequency band, ideal for 5G coverage, was crucial for expanding rural broadband and 5G deployment, and the auction framework included measures to promote competition (such as set-aside spectrum for smaller carriers).
• 2021 – 3500 MHz 5G Auction: Canada’s largest spectrum auction to date took place in June–July 2021 for the 3450–3650 MHz band, a core mid-band for 5G. Twenty-three companies qualified, and 15 bidders won licenses after 103 rounds of bidding (3500 MHz auction – Process and results – Canada.ca). To encourage competition, ISED set aside up to 50 MHz for regional/small carriers in each area and imposed spectrum caps on large national carriers. The auction awarded 1,495 out of 1,504 available licenses and yielded C$8.91 billion in revenue – a record-high for Canada (3500 MHz auction – Process and results – Canada.ca) (3500 MHz auction – Process and results – Canada.ca). The three national carriers (Rogers, Bell, Telus) together spent roughly 80% of this total, and regional players (Xplornet, Videotron, SaskTel, Eastlink, etc.) secured the set-aside portions. This 3500 MHz auction marked a key milestone for 5G, reallocating spectrum that had previously been used for fixed wireless services into flexible use for mobile broadband (3500 MHz auction – Process and results – Canada.ca).
• 2023 – 3800 MHz 5G Auction: In October–November 2023, ISED auctioned the 3650–4000 MHz “C-band” spectrum for 5G. A 100 MHz cap (combined 3500+3800 holdings) was applied to prevent any one carrier from monopolizing mid-band 5G spectrum (3800 MHz auction – Process and results – Canada.ca). Over 98 bidding rounds, 20 companies won licenses – including regional ISPs and new entrants – with a total of 4,099 licenses awarded across Canada. The auction concluded on November 24, 2023, generating approximately C$2.16 billion in winning bids. This lower revenue (compared to 3500 MHz) reflected the larger amount of spectrum available (250 MHz nationwide) and the spectrum cap which effectively reserved licenses for smaller providers (Recap of the Canadian 3800 MHz C-band Spectrum Auction – Frank Rayal). The 3800 MHz results – with licences going to 20 bidders, including many local and regional operators – are expected to enhance 5G competition and rural connectivity as Canada continues rolling out next-generation networks (Canada Concludes 3800 MHz Spectrum Auction, Awarding 4,099 Licences).

(Note: In addition to these major auctions, Industry Canada/ISED has periodically held smaller auctions for niche purposes, such as local licenses in millimeter-wave bands, but the list above covers the most significant national spectrum auctions and their outcomes.)

Key Legislation and Regulatory Decisions Shaping Spectrum Policy in Canada

Radiocommunication Act (1985) – The Radiocommunication Act is the primary law governing radio spectrum in Canada. It vests authority in the federal Minister (now ISED) to manage and license radio frequencies, regulate radio apparatus, and prevent interference. In 1996, Parliament amended the Act to explicitly allow the Minister to use market-based spectrum assignments (i.e. auctions) and issue spectrum licenses (Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications (42nd Parliament, 1st Session)). This change, made via the 1996 Budget Implementation Act, marked a shift from “comparative review” licensing to competitive bidding for high-demand bands. The Act was further amended in 2014 to give ISED the power to levy Administrative Monetary Penalties (AMPs) for spectrum licence violations, enhancing enforcement of license conditions (e.g. deployment requirements). Under the Radiocommunication Act, the Minister issues spectrum policies, technical rules, and licenses in pursuit of the objectives of the Telecommunications Act (1993) (HE8679_.C2_F7_2011_c.2_Framework_for_spectrum_auctions_in). The Act provides a technology-neutral framework for spectrum management, meaning it does not specify services but broadly enables allocation of frequencies to various uses as needed (Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications (42nd Parliament, 1st Session)). It also enables Canada to implement international spectrum agreements (e.g. with the ITU and coordination with the U.S.) to minimize cross-border interference. Overall, the Radiocommunication Act gives ISED flexibility to assign frequencies by auction or other means, to set licence fees, and to impose conditions ensuring efficient spectrum use and interference-free operation.

Telecommunications Act (1993) – This Act establishes the regulatory framework for telecom carriers and services in Canada, separate from the technical spectrum licensing. It enumerates broad Canadian telecom policy objectives (Section 7), including facilitating reliable and affordable communications for all regions, enhancing the efficiency of Canadian telecommunications, and fostering increased competition and innovation (Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications (42nd Parliament, 1st Session)). The Act empowers the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to regulate telecommunications services and carriers. While the Telecommunications Act does not directly assign spectrum, it intersects with spectrum policy in that a healthy, competitive wireless market (one policy objective) depends on how spectrum is allocated. The Act also contains provisions enabling the federal Cabinet (Governor in Council) to issue policy directions to the CRTC or to review and vary CRTC telecom decisions. For example, in 2006 the government issued a Policy Direction under this Act instructing the CRTC to rely on market forces to the maximum extent feasible, which influenced a hands-off approach to wireless pricing regulation. Conversely, in 2019, a new Policy Direction was issued emphasizing competition, affordability, and consumer interests (Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications (42nd Parliament, 1st Session)). These directives have guided CRTC decisions on wholesale wireless access and other matters (see below). Importantly, the Act’s Section 8 forbids the CRTC from regulating “rates, terms or conditions” of radiocommunication services provided by carriers under spectrum licenses from ISED, leading the CRTC to forbear from rate-regulating mobile wireless services in the 1990s (on the expectation that spectrum licensing of multiple competitors would protect consumers). In summary, the Telecommunications Act sets the pro-competitive, pro-consumer policy backdrop against which ISED’s spectrum auctions and the CRTC’s telecom rulings operate in tandem.

Broadcasting Act (1991) – This Act governs the regulation of radio and television broadcasting in Canada. The CRTC administers this Act, supervising a Canadian-owned broadcasting system in support of cultural policy goals (Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications (42nd Parliament, 1st Session)). Under the Broadcasting Act, the CRTC, not ISED, issues licenses to broadcasting undertakings (TV and radio stations, networks, and distributors) and ensures foreign ownership restrictions in broadcasting (non-Canadians cannot hold broadcast licenses) (Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications (42nd Parliament, 1st Session)). Spectrum policy for broadcasting is closely coordinated between ISED and the CRTC: Industry Canada (ISED) certifies and allots the technical frequencies (through broadcast certificates) while the CRTC awards the content licenses. By law, operating a broadcaster requires both a CRTC license and an ISED technical authorization (HE8679_.C2_F7_2011_c.2_Framework_for_spectrum_auctions_in). Notably, broadcast spectrum has historically been assigned by comparative hearings or first-come issuance rather than auctions – the Framework for Spectrum Auctions explicitly states that Industry Canada will not auction off broadcasting licenses. (However, if broadcast spectrum is repurposed for non-broadcast uses, ISED may auction it – for example, the TV channels in the 700 MHz and 600 MHz bands were auctioned for mobile services once they were no longer needed for OTA television.) The Broadcasting Act also sharply limits the Cabinet’s ability to intervene in CRTC broadcasting decisions to ensure arm’s-length cultural regulation (Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications (42nd Parliament, 1st Session)). Major broadcasting-policy decisions that affected spectrum usage include the CRTC’s plan for the digital television transition: the CRTC required most urban analog TV transmitters to shut down by August 31, 2011, and transition to digital-only broadcasting. This digital transition (coordinated with the U.S.) freed up 84 MHz of prime spectrum (the 700 MHz band), which ISED then reallocated to mobile broadband. Likewise, a further 600 MHz TV repacking was completed in 2020, following which ISED auctioned that band in 2019. In essence, the Broadcasting Act framework ensures that any reallocation of broadcast spectrum (a public resource) to other services occurs with due consideration of broadcasting’s cultural importance, while enabling surplus TV/radio spectrum to be refarmed for new telecommunications services when appropriate.

Key Spectrum Policy Frameworks and Ministerial Decisions

Over the years, the Minister of Industry (now Innovation, Science and Industry) has issued important spectrum policy statements and decisions that shape how ISED manages the airwaves:

• Spectrum Policy Framework for Canada (2002, updated 2007) – This high-level policy document set a single overarching objective: “to maximize the economic and social benefits that Canadians derive from the use of the radio frequency spectrum.” One of its core enabling guidelines is that “market forces should be relied upon to the maximum extent feasible” in spectrum management (HE8679_.C2_F7_2011_c.2_Framework_for_spectrum_auctions_in). In practice, this meant a strong preference for auctions or other market mechanisms to assign spectrum where demand exceeds supply. The Framework also affirms that spectrum is a public resource that should be allocated efficiently to benefit Canadians, and that minimally restrictive rules should be applied, allowing flexibility in use. These principles have guided ISED in adopting auctions as the default assignment method since the late 1990s and in liberalizing many license conditions (allowing secondary market transfers, technology-neutral licenses, etc.). The Spectrum Policy Framework provides ISED staff a basis to develop band-specific policies (through public consultations) consistent with the overall objective.
• Competitive Licensing (Auctions) vs. First-Come Licensing – Pursuant to the above Framework, Industry Canada established a Framework for Spectrum Auctions in 1999 (updated 2011) to outline when auctions are used. If spectrum supply exceeds demand, ISED may simply issue licenses on a first-come, first-served (FCFS) basis, but when demand is expected to outstrip supply, a competitive process (usually an auction) is used by default (HE8679_.C2_F7_2011_c.2_Framework_for_spectrum_auctions_in). This approach was enabled by the 1996 Radiocom Act amendments and first implemented in the 1999 auction. Certain spectrum is exempt from auctions: frequencies for public safety, national security, and other priority uses are typically assigned via direct allocation or FCFS to the responsible agencies (auctions “will generally not be used to license spectrum in bands designated for vital safety and security services” like law enforcement or defense). Similarly, satellite orbit/spectrum assignments often are coordinated internationally rather than auctioned, unless Canada has a domestic orbital slot to award. ISED has occasionally chosen comparative (beauty contest) licensing when auctions were deemed impractical (e.g. for some satellite licenses or in situations with unique policy objectives). Overall, since 1999 Canada has conducted about two dozen spectrum auctions (major ones summarized above) and moved increasingly toward flexible, service-agnostic licensing to let licensees deploy the latest technologies. The total revenue from major spectrum auctions in Canada exceeded C$17.4 billion by 2019 (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada), which goes to the federal Consolidated Revenue Fund. While revenue is a consideration, ISED’s auction design also heavily emphasizes competition – rules like spectrum caps, set-aside blocks for new entrants, and “use it or lose it” deployment requirements have been frequently applied to prevent spectrum hoarding by dominant carriers and to encourage timely roll-out of services (3800 MHz auction – Process and results – Canada.ca) (3500 MHz auction – Process and results – Canada.ca). For example, the 2008 AWS-1 auction had about 40% of licenses reserved for new entrants, and the 2021 3500 MHz auction set aside 50 MHz for smaller providers in most regions (3500 MHz auction – Process and results). These policy conditions stem from ministerial decisions announced prior to each auction (often via a Policy Framework Gazette notice or news release).
• Foreign Ownership Policy and Carrier Consolidation – Though not part of spectrum law per se, Canada’s telecom ownership rules have impacted spectrum outcomes. Until 2012, carriers had to be Canadian-owned and controlled, which meant early wireless new entrants (e.g. WIND Mobile in 2008) faced restrictions on foreign investment. In 2012, the Telecom Act was amended to exempt carriers with under 10% market share from these ownership limits, enabling greater foreign capital for new entrants. This policy change was a ministerial initiative to bolster competition (allowing WIND’s foreign parent to increase its stake). Spectrum licenses cannot be transferred to non-Canadians, so this change effectively allowed smaller licensees more financial flexibility. On consolidation: the Minister of Industry (now ISED) must approve license transfers that result from mergers or acquisitions, to ensure they meet spectrum policy objectives. A notable case was the 2013 attempted acquisition of new entrant Mobilicity by Telus, which Industry Canada blocked on policy grounds (to keep spectrum out of incumbents’ hands for the set-aside’s intended duration) (Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications (42nd Parliament, 1st Session)). More recently, in 2016–2017 Bell’s purchase of Manitoba Telecom Services (MTS) was approved only with conditions: the Minister required Bell to divest a significant portion of MTS’s spectrum and subscribers to Xplornet and Telus, preserving competition in Manitoba (). And in 2023, after lengthy regulatory reviews, the Minister approved the transfer of Shaw’s mobile spectrum licenses (Freedom Mobile) to Videotron as part of the Rogers–Shaw merger, but with “unprecedented and legally binding” conditions to guarantee Videotron’s role as a fourth wireless competitor nationwide (Statement from Minister Champagne concerning competition in the telecommunication sector – Canada.ca). Those conditions include price constraints (Videotron must offer plans 20% lower than incumbents’) and a prohibition on flipping the spectrum for at least 10 years. These ministerial decisions underscore how spectrum policy (ensuring a 4th competitor in each region) is enforced through transaction approvals and licence conditions, in addition to auctions.
• CRTC Telecommunications Decisions – The CRTC’s role in spectrum policy is indirect but significant, as it regulates the services delivered over spectrum. Several major CRTC decisions have been coordinated with ISED’s spectrum initiatives to promote competition and consumer interests: Wireless Forbearance (1994) – In the early PCS era, the CRTC decided to not regulate retail cellular/PCS rates or entry, citing sufficient competition with two cellular operators and two new PCS entrants coming. This forbearance (Telecom Decision 94-15) placed the onus on spectrum licensing to drive competition, a stance that persisted into the 2000s. Tower Sharing and Roaming (2008–2015) – As a condition of the 2008 AWS auction, Industry Canada required all mobile licensees to offer roaming on their networks and to share tower sites with competitors. The CRTC later stepped in to regulate certain aspects of these obligations: in 2015, it found that Bell, Rogers, and Telus had unduly high wholesale roaming rates and issued Telecom Regulatory Policy 2015-177, which imposed regulated caps on roaming fees charged to smaller carriers. The same year, Telecom Decision 2015-178 prohibited exclusivity provisions in tower/site sharing agreements. These CRTC actions, enabled by powers in the Telecom Act, reinforced ISED’s licensing conditions by ensuring that new entrants (freed by spectrum set-asides) could actually access incumbents’ networks at fair rates while they built out their own coverage. MVNO Access Policy (2021) – After years of debate on allowing Mobile Virtual Network Operators, the CRTC in April 2021 struck a balance: it mandated that the Big 3 national carriers must offer wholesale access to their networks for regional facilities-based carriers (e.g. Videotron, Eastlink, SaskTel) who hold spectrum licenses in certain regions. This Telecom Regulatory Policy 2021-130 created a framework for “regional MVNOs” – essentially, smaller spectrum holders can use incumbent networks outside their licensed area for a limited time, thereby expanding their service footprint. This decision was influenced by the 2019 Policy Direction (promoting competition) and was timed as new 5G spectrum (600 MHz, 3500 MHz) became available to those regional players. It aimed to support sustainable competition by leveraging spectrum that smaller carriers had acquired (or would acquire) while stopping short of forcing access for pure resellers with no spectrum. Telecom Policy Review and Future Spectrum Use – In 2018–2019, the government launched a review of all communications legislation (Telecom, Broadcasting, Radiocom). While that review’s recommendations (the 2020 Yale Report) are beyond the scope here, it underlines the growing convergence of spectrum policy with broader connectivity goals – e.g. proposals to give the CRTC a bigger role in spectrum affordability or to codify “use it or lose it” conditions in law. The CRTC already treats broadband internet as a basic service, which indirectly pressures ISED to release more spectrum for rural broadband.
• CRTC Broadcasting Decisions – On the broadcasting side, the CRTC has made decisions that free or refocus spectrum use. The clearest example was the Digital TV Transition deadline (August 31, 2011) for high-population markets, which the CRTC set in Broadcasting Public Notice 2007-53 (and related decisions). This decision, coordinated with Industry Canada, meant analog TV transmitters in mandatory markets shut off by that date, and digital transmitters were below channel 52. As noted, this liberated the 700 MHz band for mobile. The CRTC also facilitated the repacking of TV channels in the 600 MHz band post-2017 incentive auction in the U.S., allowing Industry Canada’s 2018–2019 reallocation of that band. Additionally, the CRTC’s licensing of new broadcast services sometimes had spectrum implications – for instance, licensing two satellite radio services in 2005 (XM and Sirius Canada) effectively sanctioned the use of S-band satellite spectrum in Canada (these were US satellites, but the decision brought satellite radio to Canadians under Canadian control). And when the CRTC licenses new FM radio stations or DTV channels, it does so in consultation with ISED to ensure spectrum availability. While these individual broadcast licensing decisions are numerous, the overarching theme is that broadcast spectrum usage has been gradually streamlined, with analog services (TV and radio) transitioning to digital or being decommissioned, thereby opening spectrum for wireless broadband.

In summary, Canada’s spectrum policy framework is a combination of legislation (Radiocommunication, Telecom, Broadcasting Acts), ministerial policies (spectrum auction frameworks, allocation decisions, and conditions on licenses/transfers), and regulatory decisions by ISED and the CRTC. The Radiocommunication Act gives ISED the tools to allocate spectrum (now usually via auctions under defined rules) while the Telecommunications Act and CRTC oversight ensure that having spectrum translates into competitive services and broader policy objectives (universal access, affordability) being met (Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications (42nd Parliament, 1st Session)). The Broadcasting Act ensures that the spectrum for over-the-air broadcasting is managed in the public interest of Canadians’ access to content and cultural sovereignty. Over the decades, these instruments have evolved: from administratively assigned cellular spectrum in the 1980s, to the auction era beginning in 1999, to today’s 5G auctions with pro-competition safeguards – all underpinned by the consistent principle that radio spectrum is a public resource that must be managed for the maximum benefit of Canada (HE8679_.C2_F7_2011_c.2_Framework_for_spectrum_auctions_in).

Notable Spectrum Assignments Outside the Auction Process (since the 1980s)

While auctions are now the primary method for commercial spectrum licensing, Canada has made many significant spectrum allocations and assignments through comparative selection or direct authorization. Key historical examples include:

• Introduction of Cellular Mobile (1983–1985) – Canada launched cellular telephone service in the mid-1980s by licensing two operators in each region without auctions. One license was given to the consortium of incumbent telephone companies (later known as Mobility Canada), and the other to an independent new entrant, Rogers Cantel (AndersonGow_Final_ENG_May15_02). Rogers Cantel (formed by Ted Rogers and partners) received a national cellular license in 1984, establishing the first cross-Canada cellular network, while each provincial telco (Bell, Telus’s predecessors, etc.) received licenses to operate in their territories. These 800 MHz band cellular licenses were awarded through a comparative “beauty contest” process by the federal government, not by auction. The result was a cellular duopoly in each area (Cantel and the local telco) that lasted roughly a decade. This foundational spectrum assignment set the stage for Canada’s wireless industry – Rogers Cantel launched service in July 1985, and the regional telcos (under the “Mobility” brand) also launched AMPS analog cellular networks in the mid-1980s. The government’s decision ensured competition at the outset of cellular service, at a time when auctions were not yet in use.
• Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licensing (1995) – To introduce further competition, Industry Canada expanded the mobile sector in 1995 by licensing new PCS providers at 1.9 GHz outside of an auction. Through a comparative review process, the government selected two new entrants, Microcell Telecommunications (Fido) and Clearnet Communications, as well as awarding smaller PCS spectrum blocks to the two incumbents (Cantel and Mobility telcos) . In this allocation, Microcell and Clearnet each received 30 MHz of nationwide PCS spectrum, and an additional 10 MHz each was granted to Rogers Cantel and the Mobility Canada consortium. These PCS licenses (in the band 1850–1910 / 1930–1990 MHz) were given 10-year terms. The decision to bring in two fresh national carriers via a beauty contest was pivotal – by 1997, Clearnet and Microcell had launched digital networks (using CDMA and GSM technologies respectively), breaking the cellular duopoly. This non-auction assignment greatly increased wireless competition and innovation (e.g. Fido’s pioneering of GSM in North America). Eventually, both new entrants were acquired by incumbents (Telus bought Clearnet in 2000, and Rogers acquired Microcell in 2004), but the 1995 PCS licensing achieved its aim of spurring lower prices and new service offerings in the late 1990s. It also familiarized Industry Canada with the comparative licensing of spectrum on the basis of business plans and benefits, shortly before Canada transitioned to auctions for subsequent mobile spectrum.
• Fixed Wireless and Broadband Services – Several bands were assigned to operators prior to the auction era to encourage new services: for example, in 1996–1997, Industry Canada licensed Local Multipoint Communication Systems (LMCS at ~28 GHz) to four companies (including Rogers and Videotron units) via a comparative process. LMCS was envisioned as wireless cable/Internet service, and while those early deployments did not flourish, the spectrum laid fallow until it was repurposed for 5G millimeter wave. Similarly, licenses for Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) in the 2500 MHz band (wireless cable TV) were issued in the 1980s/90s to entities like Look Communications and Craig Wireless to deliver TV to rural areas. Those were essentially broadcasting distribution licenses that came with spectrum privileges, assigned by the CRTC/ISED without auctions. Many were later consolidated into what became the 2500 MHz BRS spectrum (auctioned in 2015) (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada). Another example: portions of the 3.5 GHz band were lightly licensed to fixed wireless internet providers on a first-come basis in the early 2000s, until Industry Canada imposed a moratorium and moved to auction the band in 2004 (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada). Point-to-point microwave links in bands like 6, 11, 18, 23 GHz have always been licensed on a first-come, first-served basis (site-by-site) rather than by auction (Analysis of Canadian Wireless Spectrum Auctions: Licence Ownership and Deployment in the 700 MHz, 2500 MHz and 3500 MHz Frequency Ranges | CRTC), given these are highly directional, localized uses (e.g. telecom backhaul) that can often frequency-coordinate without exclusive area licenses. Even today, thousands of microwave link licenses are assigned through an online application process, illustrating that not all spectrum use involves competitive bidding – auctions are typically reserved for broad, flexible-use licenses covering large areas.
• Satellite Communications – Canada has a long history of satellite spectrum assignments done through policy rather than auctions. Telesat Canada, a former Crown corporation, was granted monopolistic rights to operate domestic communications satellites in the C-band and Ku-band from the 1970s through 1990s. For instance, Telesat’s Anik and Nimiq series satellites occupy Canadian orbital slots assigned via international processes (ITU filings), and Industry Canada authorized Telesat’s use of the required spectrum (no auctions, as Telesat was the sole Canadian satellite operator by policy). In the mobile satellite domain, Canada licensed MSAT in the L-band: in 1985, the government approved a joint venture (TMI Communications) to develop a mobile satellite system, leading to the MSAT-1 satellite launched in 1996 to provide voice/data services to remote regions. That L-band spectrum (around 1.5 GHz) was assigned to MSAT by coordination with the U.S., without an auction, since only one or two systems could be accommodated. Similarly, Globalstar and Iridium – global low Earth orbit mobile-satellite operators – were authorized to serve Canada in the 1990s through landing rights and spectrum approvals, not through auctions (they operated under international allotments). Even the Ku/Ka-band spectrum for satellite broadband (e.g. Telesat’s Ka-band for satellite Internet, or SpaceX’s Starlink user downlinks) has been assigned via earth-station licensing and spectrum policy framework rather than auction. Generally, because satellite spectrum/orbital slots are coordinated multilaterally (and are global in reach), Canada has chosen administrative assignment for satellites. Only in cases where multiple Canadian entities vied for the same satellite opportunity (e.g. new orbital slot filings) might a comparative selection be used, but that has been rare. The 2011 Auction Framework explicitly noted that an auction “would not be practical for an individual country” to assign spectrum where international satellite services are involved, unless it’s a domestic system where Canada has priority rights (HE8679_.C2_F7_2011_c.2_Framework_for_spectrum_auctions_in). To date, no major satellite spectrum auctions have been conducted in Canada – satellite communications have been enabled by policy-driven licensing.
• Public Safety and Government Spectrum Allocations – A portion of Canada’s spectrum is set aside for crucial public services and thus assigned outside of auctions. For example, spectrum for police, fire, and emergency medical communication (such as the VHF/UHF narrowband channels and the 700 MHz public safety narrowband segments) is allocated through departmental plans and site licensing to government agencies on a license-exempt or nominal fee basis. In 2017, Canada confirmed it would designate 20 MHz of the 700 MHz band (the D Block / Public Safety Broadband Network spectrum) for public safety broadband use (HE8679_.C2_F7_2011_c.2_Framework_for_spectrum_auctions_in) – this spectrum was reserved for first responders and not auctioned, in line with the U.S. FirstNet plan. Another example is the 4.9 GHz band, assigned for public safety mobile broadband and incident scene communications by direct licensing to municipal and provincial agencies. The Department of National Defence likewise has exclusive allocations (e.g. portions of HF, tactical VHF/UHF, radar bands, etc.) that are simply coordinated within government and never enter the commercial licensing realm. These national-interest allocations are made via Cabinet or ministerial decisions and spectrum allocation charts, reflecting that certain frequencies are too vital to subject to competitive bidding.
• Broadcasting Frequency Allotments – As noted, individual over-the-air radio and TV frequencies have been assigned by regulatory hearings, not auctions. Throughout the latter 20th century, when a new FM radio frequency or TV channel became available in a market, the CRTC would hold a public call for applications and choose a licensee based on programming merit and public interest (often with Industry Canada advising on technical feasibility). Dozens of FM stations in the 80s/90s were thus licensed, with Industry Canada then issuing the station a broadcast certificate for the specific frequency. No money bid was involved beyond cost-recovery fees – the “value” was in the privilege to broadcast. This approach treated broadcast spectrum primarily as a conduit for Canadian content rather than a tradable commodity. Only when broadcasting channels have been re-purposed (like the analog TV shutdown) has auctioning come into play. Even then, the auction proceeds from repurposed broadcast spectrum are seen as a windfall – for example, the 600 MHz band clearance was a joint Canada-U.S. effort following the FCC’s incentive auction, and Canada’s portion was allocated to mobile and auctioned in 2019 for over $3.4 billion (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada) (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada), none of which would’ve been realized under the old broadcast-only use. In the broadcasting realm, another unique spectrum assignment was for satellite radio: in 2005, the CRTC approved two satellite radio services (XM and Sirius) to operate in Canada (plus one terrestrial subscription radio that later folded). This effectively permitted the use of 2.3 GHz S-band spectrum (owned by U.S. XM/Sirius satellites) to deliver service in Canada. The CRTC’s decision imposed Canadian content and ownership conditions but did not involve an auction or fee for the spectrum itself – instead, it was a one-time authorization that leveraged spectrum already licensed in the U.S. for North America. Thus, even innovative services have been introduced via regulatory decisions rather than auctions when deemed in the public interest.
• Spectrum Transfers and Divestitures – Rather than initial assignment, some spectrum has changed hands outside auctions through mergers, trades, or re-allocations mandated by regulators. Two recent high-profile examples illustrate this: (1) Manitoba MTS’s spectrum – when regional carrier MTS was acquired by Bell in 2017, ISED’s approval required Bell to divest a set of AWS-1 and 700 MHz licenses to Xplornet Communications (to create a new competitor in Manitoba) and some to TELUS (). These licenses thus moved to new users by policy action, not auction. (2) Freedom Mobile’s spectrum transfer to Videotron (2023) – as part of the Rogers–Shaw merger remedy, approximately 50 MHz of AWS-1/AWS-3 and 600 MHz spectrum covering Ontario, B.C., and Alberta was directly transferred from Shaw’s Freedom Mobile to Quebecor’s Videotron, as approved (and indeed compelled) by the Minister (Statement from Minister Champagne concerning competition in the telecommunication sector). Videotron paid a negotiated price to Shaw, but no auction was involved; however, the transfer came with strict conditions to ensure Videotron uses that spectrum to compete aggressively beyond its home province. In both cases, the goal was to preserve a 4th mobile operator – a spectrum policy objective achieved via regulatory fiat rather than a market auction. Additionally, over the years, carriers have engaged in spectrum swap arrangements (with ISED’s consent) – for instance, Rogers, TELUS, and Bell have traded some regional licenses among themselves to align contiguous blocks, and in 2021 Videotron purchased 3500 MHz spectrum licenses from WIND (Freedom) in Western Canada in a private deal post-auction. These transactions occur under ISED’s spectrum license transfer framework, which evaluates if a transfer is in the public interest (competition being a key criterion). If a proposed transfer would overly concentrate spectrum, the Minister can deny or condition it – as happened in 2013 when Telus was blocked from buying Mobilicity’s AWS spectrum (until a later date when set-aside conditions had expired). Thus, the secondary market for spectrum is active in Canada but carefully overseen; many national-level spectrum holdings have changed hands through mergers and acquisitions rather than initial auction, all under the watchful eye of ISED and (where telecom services are affected) the Competition Bureau and CRTC.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Canada’s approach to spectrum management has combined market mechanisms – to award licenses efficiently and spur service competition – with policy interventions – to achieve social, cultural, and security objectives that markets alone might not deliver. Major mobile and fixed wireless frequencies have been auctioned since 1999, bringing significant revenue and introducing new providers (Committee Report No. 18 – INDU (42-1) – House of Commons of Canada). At the same time, essential services like broadcasting, public safety, and satellite communications have largely been handled via direct assignment or tailored licensing frameworks rather than auctions (HE8679_.C2_F7_2011_c.2_Framework_for_spectrum_auctions_in). And throughout, legislative tools (Acts of Parliament) and regulatory bodies (ISED for spectrum, CRTC for services) have worked in concert – sometimes using competitive bidding, sometimes command-and-control licensing – to ensure Canadians benefit from the airwaves. The evolution continues into the 5G era, but the foundational spectrum policies and past decisions summarized above provide the context for Canada’s current spectrum landscape.